Although private credit funds have rapidly grown into a standalone asset class over the last decade, little is known about the aggregate performance of these funds. To provide a first look at absolute and relative performance, we utilize the Burgiss database of institutional quality private credit funds. Our analysis evaluates 476 private credit funds with nearly $480 billion in committed capital, including a subset of 155 direct lending funds. We review the recent trends within private credit, provide an overview of various strategies, describe returns since 2004 and compare private credit to several benchmark indices in order to develop a preliminary view of performance and risk across various private credit strategies. Measures of absolute performance reveal IRRs that are positive for the top three quartiles across all sub-strategies. Measures of relative performance (PMEs) suggest that private credit funds have performed about as well, or better than, leveraged-loan, high-yield and BDC indexes.
Introduction
Private credit funds rapidly grew in popularity before the financial crisis, but fundraising activity slowed significantly in [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] . More recently private credit funds have collected capital commitments on par with the peak in 2008 and have cemented their position as a standalone asset class. However, little is known about the characteristics, including performance, of the asset class.
Limited disclosure requirements along with variations in strategy, differences in structure and lack of long track records contribute to the problem. Several commercial data providers collect some descriptive and performance data on these funds. However, each has a unique approach to doing so, incorporates different potential biases, and captures only a subset of the private credit fund universe.
In this analysis, we utilize the Burgiss database of institutional-quality private credit funds to evaluate performance of 476 private credit funds, including a subset of 155 direct lending funds. Utilizing this data set, we review the current trends within private credit, provide an overview of various strategies, describe returns since 2004 and compare private credit to several benchmark indices in order to develop a preliminary view of performance and risk across various private credit strategies.
Opportunities to invest in private credit have expanded dramatically over the last decade as traditional bank lending was constrained during the credit crisis and alternative sources of risk capital stepped in to fill the void. In the wake of the financial crisis, many financial institutions faced the need to de-lever, increased regulatory scrutiny and higher capital reserve requirements. In order to strengthen their balance sheets and comply with the new regulatory regimes, traditional banks curtailed their corporate lending operations. As the banks retreated, asset managers developed a plethora of private credit strategies to meet the growing capital needs of companies, particularly in the middle market. Similarly on the demand side, institutional investor appetite for private credit has grown.
Faced with a historically low interest rate environment, institutional investors have increased allocations to private credit under the auspices of attractive risk / reward characteristics, cash yields frequently with an embedded inflationary hedge, expectations for low correlation with the rest of their portfolio, and the assumptions of an imbedded liquidity premium relative to traditional fixed income investments.
The increase of both supply and demand for private credit has resulted in substantial growth closed on $118.7 billion of new fund commitments, the most of any year on record. 2 In fact, global fundraising in private credit has grown more than 2.5 times the annual growth rate of private equity buyout funds. 
The Structure of Private Credit
Private credit includes a wide array of fund structures and investment strategies, so defining the universe of private credit can be difficult. In the broadest sense, private credit investments are debt-like instruments that have no readily tradeable market or publicly quoted price. Typically, private debt is provided by non-bank entities to fund middle-market companies, but can include funding for larger companies as well. Private credit has many features similar to traditional credit instruments including variations in seniority, tenor, amortization, collateral provisions and floating or fixed interest rate coupons, among others. However, there is significant variation across private credit investment fund structures and strategies. Closed-end investment vehicles are often, but not exclusively, utilized to invest in private credit because of the limited liquidity in the underlying credits. Many private credit transactions involve the bilateral negotiation of terms and conditions to meet the specific needs and objectives of the individual borrower and lender(s) without the need to conform or comply with traditional regulatory or listing requirements. The bilateral origination of a loan between a single borrower and lender is often referred to as "direct lending", but transactions originated between a borrower and narrow group of lenders can be described as direct lending as well. Since there is often limited active trading in the primary or secondary markets for many private credit instruments, lenders tend to structure or purchase the loans with a view towards holding the exposure until maturity or a refinancing event. As a result, the instruments can include features uncommon to traditional loans, such as a structured equity component, high prepayment penalties, customized amortization schedule or a role in oversight or management of the company. Private credit also includes both performing loans as well as debt in stressed or distressed companies.
As a result of the significant variation in underlying strategies, terms, structure and liquidity, the risk and return expectations vary widely across private credit strategies. The landscape of private credit can include business development companies (BDCs), mezzanine funds, distressed funds, special situations funds, direct lending funds, and various other strategies like structured credit vehicles or multi-credit strategy funds, among others. Definitions of private credit can also be expanded to include syndicated leveraged loan funds, venture debt and peer-to-peer lending platforms like Lending Tree, Lending Club, and SoFi, but characteristics of these strategies begin to diverge from other private credit strategies.
Structured, closed-end credit vehicles like CLOs that invest in syndicated leveraged loans are often conflated with private credit. The leveraged loan market has many similar characteristics to private credit funds including structure, tenor, spread, less regulatory oversight, fewer reporting requirements and trading in a smaller, less liquid market. The CLO structure has additional characteristics that are similar to a private credit fund. However, there are substantial differences.
The underlying assets, leveraged loans, are originated by banks on behalf of large corporate borrowers, rated by the credit rating agencies, syndicated to institutional investors and subsequently traded in the secondary (over-the-counter) market. Also, syndicated leveraged loans generally have conforming characteristics such as seniority, terms and conditions and are almost exclusively originated by banks that syndicate to institutional investors, which subsequently trade or hold the loans. As a result, there is less inherent price discovery, resulting in lower yields and higher volatility in the leveraged loan market compared to most private credit strategies. Similarly, while venture debt and peer-to-peer lending platforms are more analogous to private credit in terms of price uncertainty, liquidity and lack of a trading market, they compose a very small segment of the private credit landscape in terms of total AUM and come with idiosyncratic risks that make them less similar to more common private credit strategies. Consequently, syndicated leveraged loans funds like CLOs, venture debt and peerto-peer lending are excluded from this discussion.
What follows is a brief description of the major strategies in private credit: operate under specific regulations designed to spur economic growth through investment in small-and medium-sized businesses. For example, BDCs are required to make available "significant managerial assistance" to certain qualifying investments, leading to active involvement by the BDC in the management and operations of many portfolio investments.
The majority of BDCs elect to be treated as regulated investment companies (RIC) for tax purposes, and as a result receive tax-exempt treatment on income, provided they distribute at least 90% of their investment company taxable income. The additional regulatory oversight requires detailed quarterly disclosure, including asset-level loan performance across the portfolio. BDCs can be private or publicly traded investment vehicles. Some BDCs have origination platforms allowing them to source and structure proprietary transactions while others either purchase assets in the secondary market or from other lenders. BDCs often utilize leverage at the fund level to enhance returns subject to certain statutory constraints.
Investors allocate capital to BDCs with the expectations of attractive current income and capital appreciation. Investors in publicly traded BDCs have access to all the required regulatory disclosure and the added benefit of daily liquidity. BDC managers typically target gross returns in the high single digits to low double digits range. features to achieve return targets, subject to market conditions. This hybrid structure allows a mezzanine investor to emphasize the capital preservation and current-pay features of a loan while also seeking additional upside through equity participation. Many mezzanine funds also utilize leverage at the fund level. Mezzanine fund managers typically target gross returns in the mid-to upper-teens. Distress for control strategies invest in debt positions identified as the "fulcrum security"-the security that will typically receive the equity of the restructured company upon emergence from bankruptcy, and as a result control the go-forward operations of the company. Noncontrol strategies, more typical among hedge fund managers with open-end funds, target temporary dislocations in a sector or business. These managers utilize trading strategies to derive attractive yields without pursuing control or holding their positions through a restructuring. Restructuring (or turnaround) strategies focus on acquiring assets at steep discounts that often have an attractive current yield. These strategies exert some operational control to dispose of or reposition specific assets and restructure the company's capital structure to create value. Restructuring strategies are often executed over an extended period of time, sometimes several years, and as a result, closed-end fund structures are preferred since managers can pursue their strategy without having to manage through redemption requests.
While non-control strategies often utilized fund level leverage to enhance returns, it is less common among distress for control and restructuring strategies. Distressed debt managers typically target gross returns in the mid to upper-teens and above. Distress for control and restructuring managers tend to target higher returns than non-control strategies due to the underlying risk profile, extended hold period and reduced liquidity.
 Special Situation Funds are typically closed-end vehicles that target investment in mid-to large-sized companies undergoing pricing or liquidity dislocation caused by financial stress or event-driven factors. These situations often involve borrowers with (a) stressed, complex, or underappreciated assets, (b) cyclical, contrarian, or event-driven situations or (c) broader market dislocations. These funds can invest in both privately negotiated transactions and in the secondary markets, seeking to earn strong risk-adjusted returns. Special situation funds differ from distressed debt funds in that they have a much broader mandate of the type of investments they pursue. Additionally, special situation funds can invest across the capital structure, including equity and structured equity. Special situation funds typically target gross returns in the mid-to upper-teens.
 Other Funds (structured credit vehicles, opportunity funds, multi-credit strategy funds, specialty finance strategies, etc.): There are a host of other private credit vehicles that pursue a variety of alternative strategies including: structured credit vehicles like CLO's (previously discussed), CMBS, RMBS and ABS; tactical funds that invest opportunistically anywhere in the capital structure to capture returns in idiosyncratic situations; sector specific strategies like ship leasing, aircraft leasing, royalty, art or intellectual property financing; and multi-strategy funds that pursue some combination of other strategies as part of a focus on identify and capturing returns through dislocation, illiquidity and mispricing opportunities.
As previously mentioned, a distinction is increasingly made in the market for a subcategory of funds known as "direct lending" funds. The term "direct lending" is often used interchangeably with private credit, but should distinguish private credit funds that predominantly originate investment opportunities bilaterally from private credit funds that predominantly source through a bank or some other intermediary. portfolios to an equivalently-timed investment in a benchmark index. The PME calculation discounts all cash flows (both fund contributions and distributions) using a benchmark return and provides a ratio of discounted distributions to contributions. The implication is that a PME greater than 1.0 indicates a fund (or portfolio) performance greater than the benchmark, and vice versa.
While practitioners identify private credit strategies using a wide range of methods, Burgiss adheres to a strict definitional taxonomy when categorizing funds (see Figure 3 ). For example, in order for a fund to be classified under either "Distressed" or "Mezzanine" at least 70% of the capital invested must be in distressed or mezzanine assets, respectively. Burgiss typically examines portfolio holdings to directly verify fund classification. Similarly, when Burgiss identifies an emerging new strategy or there is insufficient information to otherwise classify a fund, they will categorize the fund as "Not Elsewhere Classified (NEC)" or "Unknown", respectively. Here we combine the NEC and Unknown categories to simplify the analysis and exposition. In our sample there are 180 out of 476 debt funds that fall into the Generalist and "NEC & Unknown" categories. Additionally, Burgiss does not report a stand-alone classification for direct lending.
To abide by non-disclosure agreement requirements and safeguard the anonymity of individual funds, data are not tabulated when there are less than 5 funds in a grouping. 6 Additionally, the impacts of fund-level leverage can create significant variability in returns when evaluating performance. While the adoption of fund-level leverage is a relatively new phenomenon in private equity, it has long been utilized in private credit to enhance LP returns. BDCs have for many years benefited from access to SBIC-guaranteed debt at the fund-level. Other private credit funds have access to loans at the fund level, often times in the form of subscription lines (i.e., capital call facilities). As a result, because the cash flows in the dataset are net of fund-level leverage, two funds composed of identical underlying loan portfolios can report differing LP performance due to fund-level leverage.
In addition to the private credit categorization described in Figure 3 , we developed two additional sub-categories of direct lending funds with the assistance of Burgiss. The first sub-category, Direct Lending, includes all funds in the 476 fund dataset that directly originate 70% or more of their assets. This resulted in a subset of 155 funds being classified as Direct Lending. The Direct Lending category was further narrowed by excluding funds that are categorized by Burgiss as "Mezzanine" to obtain a subset of funds that predominantly originate senior loans. This resulted in 64 funds being classified as Direct Lending (excluding Mezzanine). 
Performance
We now turn to examining the performance of private credit funds. Our analysis focusses on pooled performance of strategies and sub-strategies which can be thought of as performance experienced by investors making size-weighted commitments to all funds in a strategy or sub-strategy.
Internal Rates of Return and Multiples
Pooled internal rates of return (IRRs) and multiples of invested capital (MOICs) by vintage year are shown in Table 3 . It is worth noting that private credit funds demonstrate generally higher We repeat the quartile analysis after bifurcating the sample into pre-crisis and post-crises subperiods and report the results in Table 5 . Pooled IRRs for 2009-2016 funds are higher than for the pre-crisis vintages for All, Mezzanine, Distressed, and Generalist funds. Interestingly, the performance of direct lending funds raised in the post-crisis period is lower than for funds raised in the pre-crises period. However, referring back to Table 3 
Private Credit Indices and Benchmarks
Pooling cash flows and quarterly NAVs across funds allows us to generate quarterly timeseries returns that can be thought of as return indices for private credit. We do this for all funds and by sub-strategy. Table 6 presents annualized returns and standard deviations for these indices as well as the ratio of annualized returns to standard deviation which is a proxy for the Sharpe Ratio. These values allow for a sense of the risk-return trade-offs amongst various strategies. In general, the index return statistics are distinct from the pooled IRRs reported in by which loans are assumed to converge to par over a 3-year horizon, regardless of the maturity date.
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Most of the time, this is a reasonable assumption which reflects the tendency of most loans to be refinanced, prepaid, or taken out prior to maturity. However, during periods such as the Global Financial Crisis when liquidity is scarce, such loans likely take longer than three years to converge to par. This could be a reason for the volatility of the CDLI being noticeably lower than that of similar indices when 2008-2009 are included.
Panel A of Table 7 .
Panel B of Table 7 reports pairwise correlations for all of the benchmark and private credit indices. For the private credit primary sub-strategies, the correlations range from around 0.6 to almost 1.0. The correlations between Direct Lending, and especially Direct Lending (excluding Mezzanine), with the other private credit strategies are lower-generally in the range of 0.3 to 0.7. This suggests that there may be significant diversification potential inside of private credit strategies. Examining the correlation between the benchmarks and the various private credit portfolios reveals that the correlations between the benchmarks and all of the primary private credit strategies are consistently positive and large (roughly between 0.5 and 0.9). The correlations between the benchmarks and the Direct Lending indices are notably lower (roughly between 0.2 and 0.6). This suggests both that there are diversification benefits to Direct Lending and that it is likely more difficult to benchmark. Finally, we note that the benchmarks themselves have pairwise correlations that vary from as low as 0.51 between LLI and CDLI to as high as 0.93 between BDC and HYI.
The analysis in this section suggests that there is not an obvious best benchmark for all private credit funds or any particular sub-strategy. Qualitatively, it appears that the levered loan index and high yield index are more appropriate benchmarks than BDCs or CDLI. One caveat for HYI is that bond returns benefited from a tailwind of generally declining interest rates over our sample period.
Risk Analysis and PMEs
To better understand the relationship between returns on the private credit indices and benchmark returns we conduct a regression analysis. Specifically we estimate a modified version of the market model as described in Dimson (1979) that includes lagged benchmark returns to account for slow updating of NAVs as reported by funds. Specifically, we estimate the model
where the dependent variable Rt is the quarterly return on a private credit index, and the independent variables are the contemporaneous benchmark return, BMt, and two lagged values of the benchmark returns. t is the estimated ordinary least squares coefficient for BMt. The estimated coefficient  is a measure of quarterly excess return and t is the model error. The two lags account for the possibility of stale NAVs. We estimate this model with quarterly returns for the full sample period, for all 7 private credit indices, using all four of the benchmark indices. Generalist index has a significantly negative alpha.
Panel B of Table 8 repeats the analysis using the BDC index as the benchmark. In general, the signs of coefficients are very similar to those reported in Panel A, however the magnitudes of coefficients are much lower suggesting that private credit indices have risk that is much lower than the BDC index. This is intuitive given the results shown previously in Table 7 Table 8 repeats the regression analysis using the leveraged loan index, LLI. The results in this case look much more like those for HYI. However, the sum of the index coefficients are uniformly higher when using LLI. Likewise, the Adjusted R-squareds are generally higher for LLI except for the Direct Lending indices. These results suggest LLI is likely a better benchmark than HYI for all strategies except Mezzanine and Direct Lending.
Panel D of Table 8 shows results using CDLI as the benchmark index. The results appear consistent with the previous concerns about the unreasonably low volatility of CDLI. In particular, the sum of index coefficients suggests that the All Funds index has risk more than twice that of the CDLI. In the case of generalist funds, the results suggest the index is more than four times as risky as CDLI. This evidence suggests that CDLI is unlikely to be a good benchmark for the All Funds, Distressed, Generalist or NEC & Unknown indices. However, the CDLI appears to provide as good or better a fit for Mezzanine and Direct Lending indices which is consistent with the objectives of its creators to define a benchmark more narrowly focused on these funds. However, the sum of index coefficients for the Mezzanine index (1.410) is still larger than might be expected. If this value is too large it would suggest that the negative alpha for Mezzanine is too low.
One way to evaluate which benchmark is best for each private credit index is to examine the Mezzanine, the HYI provides the best fit. Consequently, it appears that LLI is the best single index, but that it should not be a default choice given differences in risk and return characteristics across the various strategies.
The final step in our analysis is to calculate public market equivalents (PMEs) for each of the private credit strategies. Unlike with private equity PMEs that use stock indices as benchmarks, our candidate private credit benchmarks are not all easily investible. In particular, investing in assets that would closely match the performance of the CDLI index would require a specialized (institutional) trading platform. However, investments similar to HYI, LLI and BDCs can be done through ETFs and other fairly low-cost open-ended portfolio products.
With this in mind, Panel A of Table 9 shows Kaplan and Schoar (2005) Given the previous analysis suggesting that LLI is a good choice as a benchmark for private credit funds overall, we also calculate PMEs by vintage year using LLI and report those in Panel B of Panel C of Table 9 shows PMEs by geography using the LLI benchmark. The results indicate that relative performance outside of North America is roughly on par with that for North America.
All of the strategies in both geographies have PMEs greater than 1.0. In general, there is no clear trend towards higher performance by geography for the sub-strategies.
Altogether, the results in this section show that there are important differences across potential benchmarks that can affect how relative performance is evaluated. It appears that the public BDC index is too volatile to provide a good benchmark for private credit funds. In contrast, the CDLI benchmark probably underestimates volatility of returns in private credit, though it seems to do a reasonably good job fitting index returns for Mezzanine and Direct Lending Funds. The High Yield Index (HYI) does a good job explaining broad private credit returns, but the leverages loan index (LLI) does even better.
Conclusions
This paper provides the first detailed analysis of the performance of private credit funds. We find that funds on average provide good nominal returns with the top three quartiles of funds providing consistently positive returns across a range of strategies and vintage years. This performance is noteworthy given that our sample period includes the years during the global financial crisis. On an adjusted basis, we find that there is no single benchmark that is clearly preferred for calculating relative performance. This may be partially due to the evolving nature of the asset class (i.e., a relatively small number of funds before 2009 in many sub-strategies). With just one full cycle and a limited number of funds, it is empirically difficult to identify precise risk characteristics of different sub-strategies.
terms of overall goodness of fit. Public market equivalent (PME) measures using the LLI as a benchmark suggest that private credit has generally provided superior performance. However, other benchmarks suggest average or slightly below average performance on a PME basis. Overall, this paper provides new insights into returns and risks of private credit funds but a more definitive analysis will likely rely on observing an additional credit cycle where the performance of the large number of more recent funds can be observed. This figure provides a summary of qualitative characteristics commonly attributed to direct lending.
Advantages Risks
 Direct access to management teams can result in more in-depth due diligence  Greater flexibility to meet borrower specific needs  Opportunity to structure more attractive terms and conditions for lenders because of lack of competition (covenants, amortization, rate) The Burgiss Private Capital Classification System ('PCCS') is the set of taxonomies used to classify private capital across all levels of investing, including funds, their underlying holdings, and direct investments. Its goal is to help bring more transparency, standardization and precision to the classification process. Detailed below is a summary of the various debt-related taxonomies which have been added to PCCS, as well as additional information on how they are applied in Burgiss' datasets.
Burgiss Private Debt Investments are loans, bonds, credit derivatives and other related securities of companies, government entities or tangible assets.
Generalist
Debt investments which have less than 70% of capital invested into any single category.
Distressed
Debt investments into companies / tangible assets under stress or distress, resulting in a substantial discount to the securities' par value.
Mezzanine
Debt investments which are subordinate to other debt in the capital structure and are backed by little to no collateral. Securities are generally term loans and notes; may contain warrants / conversion rights.
Not Elsewhere Classified (NEC)
Debt investments which belong to an emerging or less meaningful area of debt investing (e.g. senior debt), and are therefore not yet formally recognized as a discrete category in taxonomy structure.
Unknown
Debt investments with insufficient information to be more precisely classified. 
High Yield Index (HYI)
ICE Bank of America Merrill Lynch Global High Yield Index (HW00) tracks the performance of USD, CAD, GBP and EUR denominated below investment grade corporate debt publicly issued in the major domestic or eurobond markets. Qualifying securities must have a below investment grade rating (based on an average of Moody's, S&P and Fitch), at least 18 months to final maturity at the time of issuance, at least one year remaining term to final maturity as of the rebalancing date, a fixed coupon schedule and a minimum amount outstanding that varies by currency. Additional details are available at: https://www.mlindex.ml.com/gispublic/bin/getdoc.asp?fn=HW40&source=indexrules
The S&P/LSTA U.S. Leveraged Loan 100 is designed to measure the performance of the largest segment of the U.S. syndicated leveraged loan market. The S&P/LSTA U.S. Leveraged Loan 100 is a market value-weighted index. LSTA/Thomson Reuters Mark-toMarket Pricing is used to price each loan in the index. LSTA/Thomson Reuters Mark-toMarket Pricing is based on bid/ask quotes gathered from dealers and is not based upon derived pricing models. The index uses the average bid for its market value calculation. Each loan facility's total return is calculated by aggregating the interest return, reflecting the return due to interest paid and accrued interest, and price return, reflecting the gains or losses due to changes in end-of-day prices and principal prepayments. The return of each loan facility is weighted in the index based upon its market value outstanding. Additional details are available at: https://us.spindices.com/indices/fixed-income/sp-lsta-us-leveraged-loan-100-index
BDC Index
The S&P Net Total Return BDC Index is designed to measure the performance of Business Development Companies. Constituent companies are BDCs that trade on the major U.S. exchanges, have float-adjusted market capitalization of at least $100 million ($75 million for current index constituents) and have for the prior 12 months prior to the rebalancing reference date, a total value traded of at least $50 million (35$ million for current index constituents). Additional details are available at: https://us.spindices.com/documents/methodologies/methodology-sp-bdc-index.pdf
The Cliffwater Direct Lending Index (CDLI) is constructed from quarterly SEC filing covering more than 60 public and private BDCs that existed during all or part of the period beginning in 2004. Those BDCs held approximately $75 billion in assets covering more than 5,000 loans. Index reported quarterly, with 75 day lag. BDC that filed later than 75 calendar days after quarter-end or report less than 75% of their assets as direct loans are excluded. Index weighting is asset-weighted by reported "fair value". Rebalancing is done quarterly with universe reconstitution. Additional details are available at: http://www.cliffwaterdirectlendingindex.com/ 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
